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Three is Murder: The rise and fall of Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy expertsi 
 
In June 2003, Britain’s Daily Mail tabloid newspaper posed an outraged question to the nation: 
‘This woman’s new-born baby was seized on the say-so of the cot death expert who helped to 
jail Sally Clark unjustly. Hundreds more claim to be his victims. So how did Sir Roy Meadow 
come to wield such power?’. ii  This question lies at the heart of the recent history of 
Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy (MSbP) and its most prominent experts, who experienced a 
rapid rise and fall of authority in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. Roy 
Meadow famously used the term MSbP in the 1970s in The Lancet, referring to a form of child 
abuse – or, some claimed, psychiatric condition – in which caregivers (typically mothers) 
induced or faked a child’s illness.iii In extreme cases, such abuse could apparently lead to the 
death of a child. In the 1990s experts such as Meadow came to be in high demand in the courts, 
when a number of suspected MSbP cases came to prominence in the UK and USA.iv By the 
early 2000s, as the Daily Mail article implies, their reputations were in tatters and slowly being 
pieced back together. The question of how these experts came to ‘wield such power’ and why 
it was so quickly lost is indeed an important one. It speaks to important histories of expertise 
and child abuse, yet has not been investigated in these terms.  
A close study of paediatric experts in British MSbP cases indicates that their 
professional rise and fall was interwoven with particularly persuasive forms of evidence. This 
article looks first at Roy Meadow’s use of statistics in court and then at David Southall’s use 
of video surveillance in hospitals, drawing on media reports and appeal records. It shows that 
statistics and video footage spoke disproportionately to juries and to the news-reading public, 
more so than evidence that focused on bodily signs. Such evidence apparently offered certainty, 
but soon fell short of these expectations and raised concerns about medical experts 
overstepping their professional boundaries. These findings build on existing studies of medical 
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knowledge and expertise in historiography, which identify medico-legal conflict over growing 
spheres of medical expertise and highlight the socially constructed nature of ‘objective’ forms 
of scientific evidence. v  MSbP aids an understanding the place of statistics and video 
surveillance in this historiography, and newly shows the power that such ideas had in cases of 
suspected child abuse. It also demonstrates in unprecedented detail the influence of modern 
media in constructing certain types of evidence as (un)reliable, and binding the fate of experts 
to these forms of evidence. This finding fits with work on the so-called ‘CSI effect’, which 
shows how recent television culture has created unrealistic expectations about the lack of 
ambiguity in ‘good’ forensic evidence.vi  
The history of MSbP contributes to wider scholarship on expertise, the media and crime 
in modern society, but it is also highly specific to the latter decades of the twentieth century. 
MSbP cases cannot be separated from concerns about paediatric expertise and social services 
intervention in the wake of the Cleveland scandal. This scandal, in the late 1980s, raised 
concerns about the power of medical authority and of social services to remove children from 
the homes; such concerns focused on new and controversial methods of physical examination 
used for this purpose. The public attention given to alternative diagnostic methods in the 1990s 
must be seen in this context, in which the abused child’s body was in question as a form of 
evidence. Meadow and Southall both continued to testify about physical signs, but they 
apparently could no longer rely on these as paediatricians to establish their authority. 
According to The Guardian newspaper in 1987, picking up an article from the British Medical 
Journal, Meadow was also concerned that the Cleveland scandal might lead to declining social 
services intervention in cases of suspected child abuse and ‘urged child care workers to avoid 
being discouraged’.vii In this climate, both of growing concern about child abuse and anxiety 
about how reliably to diagnose it, statistics and video surveillance ostensibly offered reassuring 
clarity to medical practitioners, social services and the public alike. Turning to each of these 
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forms of evidence in turn, it is possible to see why they were both persuasive and controversial, 
and how – rightly or wrongly – they became synonymous with the authority of the individual 
expert. 
 
Damned Lies, and Statistics: Roy Meadow 
In 1989 Roy Meadow coined a ‘crude aphorism’ that would shape the courts for years to come. 
Drawing upon and adapting from the work of two American pathologists in the same year, he 
developed the following theory: ‘one sudden infant death is a tragedy, two is suspicious and 
three is murder until proved otherwise’.viii Memorable and simple, this ‘Meadow’s Law’ was 
widely known and came – to quote the Oxford Handbook of Forensic Medicine – soon to be 
‘embedded in forensic orthodoxy’.ix Perhaps most famously it played a role in a number of 
high-profile criminal trials in which Meadow testified. Only a small proportion of MSbP cases 
apparently resulted in death, but those that did were particularly high profile and often involved 
multiple unexplained infant deaths. As MSbP and Sudden Infant Death Syndrome (SIDS) 
apparently shared several features, particularly unexplained episodes of apnoea, Meadow’s 
Law implicitly lay in the background – and sometimes the foreground – of such cases. The 
memorable and simple nature of this ‘law’ helps to explain its influence, even though it 
controversially put the burden on mothers to prove their innocence. Meadow soon took his 
claims even further, making statements in court about the low statistical probability of a 
sequence of natural unexplained deaths. The 1999 Sally Clark trial is the most famous example 
of this use of statistics and of their influence, despite constituting only a small part of the 
evidence given at trial. During Clark’s two appeals, these statistics also came under scrutiny 
and Meadow with them. The memorable and influential nature of Meadow’s Law, alongside 
the disproportionate attention given to the probabilities that Meadow presented at trial, meant 
that his reputation came to be inextricably woven with statistical modes of persuasion.  
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The influence of statistics and probability work in MSbP cases must be understood in 
terms of the wider, growing cultural value placed upon statistics in medicine and in modern 
society. In the nineteenth century this growth occurred under the influence of the statistical 
sciences and the connected rise of mass data collection, such as anthropometric studies and 
registers of births and deaths. Writing on the ‘present century’, one Victorian commentator 
observed that ‘statistical science may almost be regarded as the creation of this age’.x As Ian 
Hacking has shown, probability is also a relatively recent concept; it emerged ‘suddenly’ 
around 1660, Hacking notes, and by the twentieth century medicine was one important driver 
of ‘great statistical theory in Western Europe’.xi The medical and cultural significance of 
probability is thus entwined with the modern period during which ‘probability’ became a 
science, shifting it away from early apparently superstitious links to ‘chance’.xii It took a little 
longer for this new cultural and medical significance to find a place in forensic medicine, in 
part because the power to decide the relevance of evidence and the sphere of an expert lay in 
the hands of the courts. Medical witnesses, of course, had long implicitly used probability 
within their testimony in order to give their opinion on the most likely causes of bodily signs. 
However, other explicit uses of statistics only entered the courts gradually. In the UK and other 
Western societies, such as the US, evidence involving explicit reference to probability mostly 
found acceptance in relation to certain new types of science such as DNA and fingerprinting 
in the twentieth century.xiii The gradual acceptance of statistics in the courts, alongside the more 
rapid acceptance of statistical probability in culture and society, provides a crucial backdrop to 
the use of statistics in MSbP cases.  
The role of Meadow’s statistics in the Sally Clark trial is much more complex than it 
first appears. The simple version of this story, often repeated in newspapers, is that Meadow 
testified that the chances of two SIDS deaths in one family (in the same socio-economic 
category as the Clark family) was one in 73 million. This hugely misleading figure was 
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calculated by taking the likelihood of one such case (1 in 8,543) and squaring it, to come to an 
overall probability.xiv This method, however, assumed the two events to be independent along 
the same lines as rolling the same number twice on a dice. Media reports of the case and 
particularly of subsequent appeals, part of which focused on Meadow’s statistics, often placed 
this flawed probability calculation at the centre of the trial. In practice, this statistic was a 
relatively minor part of the trial and of Meadow’s testimony. Furthermore, at first there was 
other physical evidence to support allegations of abuse and the defence team never made any 
claim that the case involved SIDS. As The Guardian asked in May 2002, looking back at the 
case, ‘the media have made much of the unfortunate and misleading statistic cited by 
prosecution expert Professor Roy Meadow … Juries are notoriously prone to prejudice, and 
that statistic may well have prejudiced the jury against Clark. But how relevant was it when 
even the defence experts accepted that neither death was a true SIDS death?’.xv The statistics 
were, in theory, only incidental to the trial. However, there is significance precisely in this 
overstatement of statistics’ role in Clark’s conviction and in the overturning of that conviction.  
The persuasive power of Meadow’s statistics lay in their apparently more clear and 
scientific status than ambiguous bodily signs, as well as in Meadow’s ability to ‘sell’ them to 
non-specialists. In one cross-examination by Mr Julian Bevan QC, cited repeatedly in law 
reports, Meadow stated that: ‘it's the chance of backing that long-odd outsider at the Grand 
National, you know … the chance of it happening four years running we all know is 
extraordinarily unlikely. So it's the same with these deaths.’xvi Although the figure of 1 in 73 
million was undoubtedly impactful in its own right, it became more memorable with this use 
of a betting analogy. This type of discursive tactic had long been a feature of the best expert 
witnesses, who were able to articulate complex science or diagnostic processes in lay terms. 
Meadow apparently later acknowledged the Grand National analogy to be ‘insensitive’, but 
this did not undermine its apparent power in the courtroom.xvii Clark’s first appeal observed 
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that there was also additional ‘overwhelming’ evidence of physical injury, so it is not possible 
to determine the extent to which statistics influenced the trial verdict, but they certainly 
captured the public imagination.xviii The report on Clark’s second appeal noted that ‘[q]uite 
what impact all this evidence will have had on the jury will never be known but we rather 
suspect that with the graphic reference by Professor Meadow to the changes of backing long 
odds winners of the Grand National year after year it may have had a major effect on their 
thinking’.xix 
On the other side, Bevan also used rhetorical devices in attempting to critique 
Meadow’s claims. He drew upon long-held suspicions of experts in asking: ‘have you heard 
the expression “Lies, damned lies and statistics”?’xx Meadow responded that ‘I don’t like 
statistics but I’m forced into accepting their usefulness’, thus simultaneously acknowledging 
and dismissing jurors’ concerns; he formulated statistics not as a tool of persuasion, but as 
undeniably useful evidence. Other testimony critiqued Meadow’s statistical work on less 
rhetorical grounds, but – despite being borne out in the long run – had less impact during the 
trial. As one appeal noted: 
… the defence case on the evidence was supported in part by evidence from Professor 
Berry to the effect that the risk of a SIDS death was inherently greater where there had 
already been one SIDS death. Whilst he accepted the 8,543 statistic in relation to a first 
SIDS death in low risk families as an observed figure, he regarded squaring it to 
calculate the risks of a second SIDS death to be an illegitimate over-simplification.xxi  
Berry’s evidence also apparently drew attention to caveats in the original source material for 
Meadow’s calculations, the report of the Confidential Enquiry into Stillbirths and Deaths in 
Infancy (CESDI). Furthermore, the judge even indicated to the jury in his summing up: 
‘however compelling you may find those statistics to be, we do not convict people in these 
courts on statistics. It would be a terrible day if that were so. If there is one SIDS death in a 
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family it does not mean that there cannot be another one in the same family’.xxii In the light of 
these caveats, and other evidence given about injuries to the girls, it seems surprising that so 
much attention has been paid to Meadow’s statistics in the intervening years. In part this is 
because of the statistics’ apparent persuasiveness and memorability, compared with the 
warnings against placing too much weight upon them. As the Observer declared, these statistics 
held great power over juries as ‘an arrow through the fog’, a ‘statistical smoking gun’ and a 
compelling ‘soundbite’.xxiii  
The media in part fuelled this influence. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, tabloids had 
run stories on Meadow’s work under headings such as ‘Cot Death Tots often Murdered’ and 
‘Baby-Killer Mothers: Cot deaths are a cover-up for murder, claims doctor’.xxiv These kinds of 
articles began to establish statistics and probability as a viable basis for such claims, for 
example noting that ‘Professor Roy Meadow wrote in the British Medical Journal “Between 2 
and 10 per cent of babies labelled as dying from sudden infant death syndrome have probably 
been smothered”.’xxv These kinds of reports may have contributed to a broader culture that was 
initially sympathetic to – and interested in – Meadow’s testimony at the Clark trial. In 1999 the 
tabloid Mirror reported on the conviction of ‘baby killer Sally Clark’ and referred only in broad 
terms to ‘signs of previous physical abuse’ alongside the following statement: ‘[c]ot death 
expert Professor Roy Meadow told how the chances of two infants dying of sudden infant death 
syndrome in such an affluent family were 73 million-to-one.’xxvi Another tabloid, the Daily 
Mail, similarly reported on its front page that ‘Sally Clark claimed both 11-week-old 
Christopher and eight-week-old Harry were cot-death victims, the jury was told … But experts 
put the odds against such a double tragedy at 73 million to one. And after a post-mortem 
examination found Harry had been shaken to death the case of Christopher was reopened’.xxvii 
This kind of reporting shows the broad public appeal of this kind of statistic, with its apparent 
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clarity and simplicity. No other evidence was reported in much detail, but the statistic was 
always reported in specific terms.  
This kind of reporting may have had repercussions for jurors in subsequent similar trials. 
Meadow also gave evidence in trial of Angela Cannings in 2002, before Sally Clark’s 
successful appeal, for the murder of two of her infants after three apparently died from cot 
death. Specific probabilities were absent in the trial, certainly in the persuasive form presented 
in the Clark case, but broad references to the likelihood of such occurrences were scattered 
throughout testimony for the prosecution. As The Telegraph later reported, Meadow testified 
that there were ‘incredibly long odds’ against two SIDS deaths.xxviii In the light of the media 
coverage of the (as yet not overturned) Clark case, it seems possible that jurors may have linked 
such vague statements to Meadow’s earlier more specific testimony. Professor of Mathematics 
Ray Hill, in his ‘Reflections on the Cot Death Cases’, notes that ‘[t]he 73 million figure was 
still fresh in people’s minds and John Batt, who sat through the trials of both Clark and 
Cannings, is convinced that Meadow’s infamous statistic must have entered the privacy of the 
jury room.’xxix Such claims are, however, impossible to prove. 
Meadow’s professional status was closely entwined with the fate of this statistical 
evidence. Sally Clark’s appeal eventually succeeded primarily because of other overlooked 
physical evidence, but the media again tended to focus on Meadow’s work on probability. 
Media citations of Meadow’s statistics quickly turned critical, as his errors of calculation began 
to become apparent during the appeal process. In 2001 John Sweeney, a campaigner for Clark’s 
release, wrote for the Daily Mail and The Observer on genetic research that showed ‘multiple 
cases could be more likely than previously thought’.xxx He also cited a microbiologist as 
declaring Meadow’s evidence as ‘scientifically illiterate’ and a profession of statistical science 
who stated that ‘this statistic is poor science’; science and rhetoric thus started to come together 
in the media in resistance to Meadow, rather than in his service.xxxi Such comments might also 
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represent the growing place of genetics in the public imagination. By Clark’s appeals in 2003 
there was a flood of broadsheet and tabloid stories that were sympathetic to accused parents 
and highly critical of Meadow. Nearly all of these articles cited his erroneous statistic, many 
alongside other professionals or professional bodies that critiqued his calculation. In December 
2003, for example, the Mirror noted that ‘the Royal Statistical Society took the unprecedented 
step of writing to the Lord Chancellor stating that there was “no statistical basis” for the 
figure’.xxxii 
The intervention of statisticians into this debate helped to save the reputation of 
statistics as a profession. By focusing on the errors that resulted from statistics in the hands of 
a non-specialist, statistics per se were not perceived as problematic. Instead Meadow’s 
expertise was put on trial in relation to two aspects of his statistical work: firstly, his 
fundamental misuse of statistics; and secondly, his right to speak on probability as a non-
statistician. This second critique related to spheres of influence, and the remit of an expert.xxxiii 
Clark’s appeal records note that Meadow made no claim to be a statistician, despite working 
with statistics to some extent in his work, but did not deny that he overstepped his remit 
somewhat in making his claims and did not make his limited knowledge sufficiently clear. This 
issue became crucial to Meadow’s later struggle with the General Medical Council (GMC), in 
which he was first removed from the medical register and later reinstated. His appeal decided 
that ‘by giving evidence of statistics which he had misunderstood and by failing to make clear 
that he was not an expert in statistics, the doctor was guilty of professional misconduct’ but 
that it should not be treated as more ‘serious’ on the basis of his ‘eminence’. xxxiv  This 
professional conduct enquiry raised important questions about whose right and responsibility 
it was to determine spheres of expertise. Some argued, on Meadow’s behalf, that any evidence 
permitted to go to court (after being presented in advance) was implicitly accepted as within 
the expert’s remit: ‘the witness is giving evidence in an adversarial contest in which the judge 
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and the lawyers hold sway. All questions of legal relevance and admissibility are for the parties 
and the judge and not for the expert’.xxxv Ultimately, in the light of such considerations, the 
GMC decided that Meadow’s misconduct was not sufficiently ‘serious’ to require him to be 
removed from the medical register.  
Meadow’s rise and fall cannot be understood without reference to his statistics and 
work on probability. The Clark trial show how these statistics came fundamentally to shape his 
public and professional profile when – to cite appeal records – they were ‘very much a side-
show at trial’.xxxvi The reasons for this lie in a range of factors, from the power of statistics in 
modern culture to controversy around the sphere of medical expertise. Coming in living 
memory of Cleveland, statistical work in paediatrics first offered reassuringly clear evidence 
and later fed into lingering anxieties about zealous social services removing children on the 
basis of dubious medical advice. The status of Meadow as an expert witness thus was 
impossible to separate from Meadow’s Law and his statistical evidence, even though these 
undoubtedly were only a part of his work and diagnostic practice. Meadow’s work also 
indicates that the power of statistics cannot be separated entirely from rhetorical devices, 
personality and expertise. In turn, and by extension, this case study indicates that the history of 
expertise must be understood in relation to forms of evidence and persuasion. Overall, 
Meadow’s use of statistics supported some aspects of his expert role (status, profile and 
persuasion) and undermined others (authority within a given science). 
 
Diagnosis Television: David Southall 
In the first years of the twentieth-first century, Roy Meadow’s story came to be closely 
connected in the public eye with that of another paediatrician: David Southall. Southall’s 
trajectory in some ways aligns very closely with that of Meadow: he was a pioneer in 
diagnosing cases of MSbP and worked closely with the police and social services when cases 
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of MSbP were suspected. He gained a high profile for this work, at first in largely positive 
terms and later in more critical ones. Southall’s status as an expert was also closely interwoven 
with a particular form of evidence: in this case, film, in the form of covert video surveillance. 
Southall’s work was conducted largely out of the courts, as his cases often related to the 
ongoing abuse of children rather than to suspicious deaths, but still formed the basis of police 
or social service interventions. As concerns grew in general about paediatric interventions, in 
the wake of Clark’s successful appeal, and Southall underwent his own GMC investigations, 
covert video surveillance came increasingly to be rejected as an investigative tool. Southall’s 
child protection career was inextricably woven with the fate of covert video surveillance in the 
public eye. At first video evidence provided certainty for the inherently different sphere of 
child abuse and child protection, but later again came also to represent the paediatrician who 
overstepped his boundaries. 
David Southall’s use of covert video surveillance started in the mid-1980s at the Royal 
Brompton Hospital in London, before being continued at North Staffordshire Hospital. As with 
statistics, it is important to place Southall’s use of film in context. In 2008, looking back at the 
Southall and Meadow cases, Theodore Dalrymple in the Spectator noted that Southall’s work 
was unusual at the time: ‘before the average Briton was videoed 300 times a day as he went 
about his business’.xxxvii As Pete Fussey and Jon Coaffee note, in the Routledge Handbook of 
Surveillance Studies, ‘the UK experience an unprecedented and accelerated deployment of 
video surveillance across its urban spaces during the 1990s … From the 1990s onwards in the 
UK, surveillance cameras held privileged status amongst the assortment of Home Office crime 
prevention strategies’.xxxviii  Albeit for different reasons than statistics, related to technology 
and cost rather to the development of a profession, the moving image also had an increasingly 
important place in modern culture more widely. With the exception of deliberately doctored 
film footage, which was never raised as a concern in relation to Southall’s work, it was 
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generally perceived as a relatively reliable form of documentation. The growing centrality of 
the moving image in culture, and particularly of surveillance, meant that video also took on 
increasing significance as a crime detection and prosecution tool. By 2004 there were an 
estimated 4,285,000 cameras in the UK, which – Josh P. Davis and Tim Valentine argue – had 
‘proportional effects on the evidential use of images’ in court.xxxix This context is crucial for 
understanding the influence of Southall’s work, as public interest in – and the influence of – 
his covert video surveillance grew significantly in the 1990s alongside video surveillance in 
general. The relative newness of this form of evidence, particularly in the 1980s, also explains 
the somewhat ambivalent reception of his work. 
Southall, along with others in the team, first reported their findings from covert video 
surveillance in the medical press. In 1987, for example, Southall et al. reported in the British 
Medical Journal (BMJ) on ‘apnoeic episodes induced by smothering: two cases identified by 
covert video surveillance’. They argued that ‘diagnosis by video surveillance produces 
unequivocal evidence in these cases and avoids the need for medical and nursing staff to 
confront the mother with a possibly incorrect suspicion or in a court of law’.xl Covert video 
surveillance was thus advocated on the basis of its apparently incomparably ‘unequivocal’ 
nature. Tape recordings of breathing and ECG monitoring in cyanotic episodes raised 
suspicions, but apparently only video could provide proof. Video recordings were also 
accessible and easy to understand for non-specialists. While the British press showed some 
concerns about the ethics of these methods, as discussed further below, most early medical 
reports were broadly supportive due to the difficulties of reliably diagnosing MSbP.  Perhaps 
unsurprisingly some of this support came from Roy Meadow who, in response to the 1987 case 
studies, wrote in the BMJ that ‘[f]ilmed evidence of abuse is a marvellous piece of diagnostic 
evidence for the doctor … An additional advantage of recorded evidence is that it can be shown 
to the mother, who then admits to the abuse in detail.’xli Implicit in such reports was an idea 
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that the ends justified the means in Southall’s use of covert video surveillance, alongside a 
sense that video evidence was unique in its value. Its power was in part apparently a self-
fulfilling prophecy: because the public believed it to be a more compelling form of evidence 
than forensics, it could induce a confession from mothers who otherwise excelled at deception. 
Some medical practitioners did, though, articulate concerns about the doctor’s role in such 
surveillance. One psychiatrist wrote in 1993, in correspondence to the BMJ, ‘[i]t has never 
been part of a doctor’s duty to detect or investigate crime.’xlii  
Despite ongoing questions about the ethics of covert video surveillance, it was 
gradually accepted as a legitimate form of evidence in the courts. Its apparent certainty at first 
overcame many of these reservations, for the courts and health professionals at least. In 1993 
Southall had engaged directly in some debates in the BMJ about whether covert video 
surveillance was compatible with the 1989 Children’s Act, and – again – about the doctor’s 
appropriate place (as opposed to the local authority or police) in such interventions.xliii By 1994 
covert video surveillance was accepted by the Department of Health, even though it remained 
on the agenda of the British Medical Association’s ethics committee.xliv The Guardian reported 
in the same year that a British Association of Paediatrics study supported the use of covert 
video surveillance, although ‘only when there is reasonable prospect of a positive finding’.xlv 
Law reports from 1994 show that case law decisions also gave covert video surveillance an 
official place in family courts by this date, stating that ‘evidence produced by covert video 
surveillance was generally admissible.’xlvi Such evidence was even given special status, in 
being considered admissible even if ‘unlawfully or improperly obtained’. While ethics 
remained a concern, such tactics were seemingly preferable to removing children from parents 
on uncertain grounds or failing to protect vulnerable children. The growing professional status 
of expert paediatricians, such as Southall, was interconnected with the growing influence of 
this kind of evidence in care proceedings.  
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The media ensured that Southall became synonymous with this form of evidence, in 
line with Meadow’s trajectory, even though covert video surveillance was only one part of his 
team’s process of detecting MSbP cases. In 1993, when The Observer ran a story headed 
‘Video traps catch abuse of children by parents’, it indicated that Southall was actually trying 
to separate himself from this kind of publicity. ‘The debate should not focus on the techniques,’ 
it quoted him as saying ‘but the reasons why these parents are driven to abuse their children’.xlvii 
Such pleas apparently fell on deaf ears, as media reports continued to focus on the findings and 
ethics of covert video surveillance. The Guardian in 1997 wrote largely in support of Southall, 
noting that his methods offered ‘the only way of securing the evidence’.xlviii However, the tone 
of broadsheet and tabloid media alike soon turned against Southall.  
In 1999 there was a conspicuous shift in the tone of reporting on covert video 
surveillance, in the wake of a Yorkshire Television documentary called Someone To Watch 
Over Me that showed some of Southall’s original footage. The show’s producer acknowledged 
that there were concerns about the ‘ethics of showing child abuse on network television’, but 
also noted the ‘mixture of horror and fascination’ that drew the public to such images.xlix In the 
wake of this documentary Terry Thomas, reader in social work at Leeds Metropolitan 
University, questioned the surveillance in the Guardian: ‘if you have the evidence, why the 
need to film? Surely you are only putting the child at further risk’.l The BMJ responded directly 
to Thomas’ article and to other media critiques of Southall, at first largely in support of his 
work. Annabel Ferriman noted that ‘with good video evidence … doctors might be able to 
protect the parents' other children from further harm and, with a well informed public behind 
them, might be able to make progress in combating abuse’.li Ferriman articulated surprise that 
the documentary was not supported by the Community Practitioners' and Health Visitors' 
Association, in the light of its potential value for public awareness about MSbP. However, 
public fascination with the footage was balanced with apparent horror at its graphic content 
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and covert nature, in a general social context of growing surveillance and declining privacy. 
Documentary footage turned the tide of public opinion against Southall, with visual culture 
proving to be both his making and unmaking.  
Around the same time, the media focused increasingly on David Southall as an 
individual. In 1999 Yvonne Roberts reported on the concerns of a number of critics of 
Southall’s work who ‘claim Southall entrapped parents, placing them in situations where they 
behaved out of character’.lii Such media coverage started to sow the seeds of doubt about an 
evidence form previously deemed ‘unequivocal’, pointing to 34 prosecutions that arose from 
Southall’s work and the large number of children removed from families in consequence. 
Although giving Southall the opportunity to respond, the questions that this interviewer posed 
to Southall indicated a growing media interest in his power as an individual expert: 
‘[t]echnically, he works as just a part of a team, but a doctor with authority, I point out, can 
easily wield disproportionate influence’.liii This trend was also evident in tabloid papers. In 
2000 the Daily Mail reported on mothers’ protests against Southall’s work and posed the 
question: ‘caring crusader or a medical zealot?’liv This article notably shifted visual register 
from some of the earlier publications on Southall’s work. It was accompanied by a picture of 
Southall’s face rather than stills from the video surveillance or images of children, as had been 
the case in earlier articles. lv  A liberal broadsheet and conservative tabloid alike thus 
demonstrated quite a significant shift in only two years, from support to suspicion, and an 
increasing tendency to focus on Southall as an individual. The reports indicate that this shift 
was in part a response to campaigns against Southall’s work, particularly by accused mothers. 
Such reporting further entwined the reputation of Southall as a practitioner with covert video 
surveillance as a method. 
Southall’s professional ‘fall’ was formalised, like Meadow’s, through  investigations 
by his employers and the GMC . Again,  these investigations centred in part on questions about 
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the remit of Southall’s work and questions about whether he overstepped the boundaries of his 
expertise. The campaigns against Southall were multiple and took place over a relatively long 
period of time. Complaints about his use of covert video surveillance, which had actually 
already ended in the wake of earlier media coverage, and concerns about ethics in another 
unrelated study resulted in Southall’s suspension in 1999. Although it was not new information 
that Southall had been conducting such surveillance (in his own words ‘there has been a seven-
year campaign aimed at discrediting me’), his employers yielded to public pressure and parents’ 
allegations of false claims. lvi  This suspension was overturned in 2001, when the North 
Staffordshire NHS Trust decided that ‘there is no evidence of inappropriate use’ of covert video 
surveillance and that Southall had ‘always acted in a way that promoted the best interests of 
children under his care’. lvii  Despite this decision, Southall’s reputation was seemingly 
irreparably damaged in consequence of his professional fate becoming entwined with that of 
video surveillance.  
The moving image also affected Southall’s career in other ways. After watching a 
Channel Four ‘Dispatches’ documentary about Sally Clark, in April 2000, Southall suggested 
to the police that they investigate the possibility that Clark’s husband had committed the crimes. 
In the wake of Clark’s successful appeal, and the general turning of the tide against paediatric 
experts in MSbP, in 2004 he was subject to a GMC investigation and suspended from child 
protection work for three years . Like Meadow’s use of statistics, this decision in part related 
to an apparent stepping outside of an appropriate sphere of expertise, in making an accusation 
based on television evidence rather than physical examination:  the GMC argued that Southall 
‘abused his professional position by, in effect, misusing his eminence in the field of child 
abuse’.lviii Expert status came with certain responsibilities, namely not to use this status to sell 
unsubstantiated theories. Southall defended his decision, claiming that his conclusions were in 
fact drawn from professional experience rather than simply instinct; he argued that a nosebleed, 
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which occurred in the father’s presence, was consistent with ‘intentional suffocation’.lix At first 
he garnered little support, however, and in fact his apparent lack of remorse worked against 
him in the press.  The Daily Mail ran a story alongside a full-length image of Southall, declaring 
‘In tatters, his marriage and his reputation’ after the GMC decision.lx Although the suspension 
from child protection work was lifted in due course, the GMC then struck Southall from the 
medical register in 2007 for further ’serious professional misconduct’ including accusing 
another mother of killing her 10-year-old son. Southall eventually also successfully appealed 
against this decision, but he never managed to separate himself from the various forms of 
controversial visual culture with which his expertise had become connected. 
In many ways, David Southall’s work and tools of persuasion differed from those of 
Roy Meadow. Southall’s influence was rarely over a trial jury, and consequently his evidence 
and methods of persuasion were not directly questioned through appeals to criminal verdicts. 
The use of covert video surveillance was also critiqued on quite different grounds to statistics, 
often related more to ethics and consent than to the reliability of the evidence. Some parents 
argued that video evidence constituted a form of entrapment and therefore was not reliable, but 
in general the ‘truth’ of covert video surveillance was largely unchallenged. On the other hand, 
there are a number of significant overlaps between covert video surveillance and statistics. The 
first relates to questions around expertise and the appropriate remit of the expert. The second 
relates to the ways in which individual experts came to be equated with particular forms of 
persuasion, typically those that appeal to the press and public and that tapped into wider social 
trends. Overall, with video and statistics alike, the career trajectory of the ‘expert’ aligned with 





In 2004 a BMJ article ran with the following caption: ‘Media vilification of paediatricians 
acting in cases of alleged child abuse has resulted in widespread confusion about research data 
and threatens the systems to protect vulnerable children. How should we move forward?’lxi 
The wake of the Meadow and Southall professional misconduct verdicts, along with a wave of 
successful appeals in child abuse cases, had left paediatrics in a precarious position in child 
abuse cases. As the BMJ article implied, in part this was the result of the status of paediatricians 
becoming so closely connected to the perceived value of certain forms of ‘research data’. No 
paediatrician apparently found a simple answer to the BMJ’s question of how to ‘move forward’ 
from this situation. When Roy Meadow appealed his removal from the medical register in 2006, 
the judge noted that ‘there can be no doubt that the decision has had a damaging effect in that 
it has increased the reluctance of medical practitioners to involve themselves in court 
proceedings, particularly in cases before the Family Court’.lxii Appeal records also note the 
evidence of Professor Sir Alan Craft [President of the Royal College of Paediatrics and Child 
Health] that ‘Paediatricians are frightened of getting involved in child protection work’ in 
consequence of the high-profile GMC and public campaigns against paediatricians.lxiii  
There were some attempts made to ameliorate the effect of the high-profile Meadow 
and Southall cases on the profession and on child protection. Some professionals argued that 
Meadow and Southall had been the subjects of a ‘witch hunt’, a claim that may have vindicated 
the paediatricians but which hardly eased the concerns of others ‘frightened of getting involved 
in child protection work’. lxiv Others argued in favour of continued use of these forms of 
evidence in the right hands due to the potential certainty that they offered. There were 
professional efforts to separate Southall’s professional misconduct case from the value of 
covert video surveillance, and comparable efforts to separate Meadow’s misuse of statistics 
from their general value.lxv However, media reports indicate that such efforts had little success 
in the public sphere, where the expert’s power of persuasion was dependent on their most 
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famous forms of evidence. The boundaries between expert and evidence often disappeared in 
newspapers, in which Southall / covert video surveillance and Meadow / statistics were often 
synonymous. The nuances of the cases against these paediatricians were also rarely evident in 
the media, and these associations lingered even after their successful appeals against GMC 
decisions. Statistics and video offered possible solutions to the inherent uncertainty in child 
abuse cases, along with the paediatricians who used them, but both were dismissed when their 
fallibility and ethical problems became evident. Alongside a number of successful appeals in 
MSbP cases, paediatrics was again in a precarious position in child abuse cases by the mid 
2000s.  
The purpose of this analysis has not been to make judgement on specific experts or 
evidence as good or bad. Rather, it has sought to use MSbP cases to explore relationships 
between individual experts, types of evidence and status or profile. The quite rapid change in 
fortunes of certain types of evidence, and the paediatricians aligned with them, in MSbP cases 
enables an understanding of how expertise has historically been constructed – for better and 
worse – in the public sphere. More broadly, the recent history of MSbP contributes to our 
understanding of the changing societal place of different persuasive devices over time. The 
influence of statistics and covert video surveillance in the 1990s reflected wider cultural trends, 
in which these types of evidence were increasingly central in the courts and wider society. They 
also seemed to provide certainty, which was particularly important in child abuse cases in the 
wake of Cleveland. Paediatricians stretching the limits of their expertise to seek the same kind 
of certainty, in addition to other forms of evidence, can also be understood in the same context. 
It is important to remember, though, that Meadow and Southall both used statistics and covert 
video surveillance alongside more traditional paediatric work relating to bodily signs. The main 
value of unpicking their professional trajectories, for historians, may then not lie in any story 
of deliberate methods of persuasion deployed by medical practitioners. Instead it lies in 
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understanding how expertise has historically been constructed through discussions of this 
evidence in the public sphere. Novel and apparently clear-cut forms of evidence received more 
media attention, perhaps in part because they were easy to translate to a non-specialist audience. 
As the body became an increasingly ambiguous form of evidence in the eyes of a scientifically-
oriented public, more attention was given to methods that – to draw on an earlier quote – 
offered ‘arrows through the fog’. As this history reveals, however, most ‘arrows through the 
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